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The current review focuses on how exposure to linguistic input, and count nouns in partic-
ular, affect performance on various cognitive tasks, including individuation, categorization
and category learning, and inductive inference. We review two theoretical accounts of
effects of words. Proponents of one account argue that words have top-down effects on
cognitive tasks, and, as such, function as supervisory signals. Proponents of the other
account suggest that early in development, words, just like any other perceptual feature,
are ﬁrst and foremost part of the stimulus input and inﬂuence cognitive tasks in a bottom-up,
non-supervisory fashion.We then review evidence supporting each account.We conclude
that, although much research is needed, there is a large body of evidence indicating that
words start out like other perceptual features and become supervisory signals in the course
of development.
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Word learning is a critically important task in early develop-
ment and is a necessary step in language acquisition. Further-
more, it is often argued that language affects cognition. The
reported effects range from imposing category boundaries on
sensory continua to affecting the range of concepts that peo-
ple acquire (Whorf, 1956; Gentner and Goldin-Meadow, 2003;
Gleitman and Papafragou, 2005). For example, exposure to
words may affect the way people track individual objects (Xu,
2002), learn and use categories (Yamauchi and Markman, 1998,
2000; Sloutsky and Fisher, 2004; Fulkerson and Waxman, 2007;
Lupyan et al., 2007; Plunkett et al., 2008; Ferry et al., 2010), and
make inductive inferences (Gelman and Markman, 1986; Gra-
ham et al., 2004; Sloutsky and Fisher, 2004; Keates and Graham,
2008).
The current review begins by focusing on several theoretical
considerations of how word learning, and exposure to linguistic
input more speciﬁcally, may affect performance on various cog-
nitive tasks. While many of the reviewed ﬁndings may generalize
to different word classes (e.g., verbs, adjectives, etc.), the current
paper primarily focuses on how count nouns and non-linguistic
sounds affect performance on a variety of tasks. We then discuss
empirical ﬁndings examining the necessary components under-
lying word learning (i.e., processing of arbitrary auditory–visual
pairings) and explain how these low-level cross-modal interac-
tions can account for some of the effects of words on a variety
of cognitive tasks including categorization, individuation, and
induction.
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENTS: THE ROLE OF WORDS IN
EARLY COGNITION
Although there is little disagreement as to whether words affect
cognition, the nature of these effects, their developmental time
course, and underlying mechanisms remain unknown. Some
researchers believe that from early in development, words are
names of objects and categories, and words act as invitations to
form categories (Balaban and Waxman, 1997; Xu, 2002; Waxman
and Booth, 2003). At the computational level (Marr, 1982), this
account assumes that words function as supervisory signals that
direct and guide learning. Thus, if two discriminable items share
the same count noun (e.g., both are called “a dax”), the word
serves as a top-down signal to the infant or child that these items
are equivalent in some way (cf. Gliga et al., 2010).
A second possibility is that early in development, words, just
like any other perceptual feature, are ﬁrst and foremost part of
the stimulus input, and they inﬂuence cognition in a bottom-
up, non-supervisory fashion (Sloutsky and Lo, 1999; Sloutsky and
Fisher, 2004; Colunga and Smith, 2005; Plunkett et al., 2008). The
account that words are perceptual features affecting processing of
visual input has yielded research ﬁndings where under some con-
ditions, linguistic input facilitates learning (Samuelson and Smith,
1999; Colunga and Smith, 2005; Plunkett et al., 2008); whereas,
under other conditions it hinders learning (Robinson and Slout-
sky, 2007a; Best et al., 2011a,b). When reviewing the bottom-up
account, we primarily focus on situations when auditory input
hinders learning. As we explain elsewhere (Sloutsky and Fisher,
2005), this “auditory dominance” is a consequence of words being
features.
A third account posits that words begin as part of the stimulus
input, but eventually become supervisory signals (Casasola and
Bhagwat, 2007; Casasola, 2008; Sloutsky, 2010; Plunkett, 2011).
As children develop they may learn that count nouns have high
predictive power in determining a category, and as a result, words
may become supervisory signals.While there is little disagreement
among theorists that words eventually become top-down super-
visory signals (cf. Yamauchi and Markman, 1998; Casasola and
Bhagwat, 2007; Lupyan et al., 2007; Casasola, 2008; Sloutsky, 2010;
Plunkett, 2011), the precise developmental time course remains
unknown.
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Distinguishing among these notions of how words might inﬂu-
ence cognition is of critical importance for understanding cogni-
tive development. If early in development count nouns function as
supervisory signals, then top-down effects may play a signiﬁcant
role in early cognitive development. Perhaps the most important
implication is that at both the cognitive and the neural levels,
lower-level processes (such as discrimination and generalization)
may be subject to top-down control. Also, given that supervision
(i.e., guided learning or feedback) results in the ability to learn
substantially more complex categories than unsupervised learning
(Rumelhart, 1989), if words are supervisory signals for infants and
young children, our construal of what infants can and cannot learn
early in development will be subject to substantial revision. Alter-
natively, if words become supervisory signals during the course
of development, then top-down control need not exhibit an early
onset and such control could be itself the product of develop-
ment. Understanding how the role of words changes in the course
of development has been a focus of research in our lab.
EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR WORDS AS FEATURES
Preliminary evidence suggesting that effects of words may stem
from low-level effects, as opposed to supervisory signals, comes
from studies examining children’s similarity judgments and induc-
tive generalizations (Sloutsky and Lo, 1999; Sloutsky et al., 2001;
Sloutsky and Fisher, 2004). In these tasks, participants were pre-
sented with a target item and two test items. In the similarity
judgment tasks, participants selected the test item they deemed
more perceptually similar to the target item. In the induction tasks,
participants were told an unobservable property about the target,
and they had to choose which test item also shared the same unob-
servable property. Furthermore, in no label conditions, items were
labeled with generic phrases (e.g., “Look at this one. This one has
yellow blood inside of its body.”), and in label conditions, items
were labeled with count nouns (e.g., “This is a Guga. This Guga
has yellow blood inside of its body.”).
Several ﬁndings from Sloutsky and colleagues’ similarity judg-
ment tasks are relevant for exploring whether words are supervi-
sory signals or features. First, Sloutsky and Lo (1999) demon-
strated that words inﬂuenced the perceived similarity in 5- to
7-year-olds and in 7- to 9-year-olds but not in 9- to 11-year-olds
(i.e., young children reported that two items looked more simi-
lar to each other if they shared a common label). These results
suggest that some of the effects of words on higher-order tasks
may stem from words increasing the perceptual similarity of com-
pared items, as opposed to words being top-down supervisory
signals. Second, consistent with this claim, words had compara-
ble effects on similarity judgment and induction tasks at 4–5 years
of age; whereas, words affected only inductive generalization (but
not similarity judgment) in 11- to 12-year-olds (Sloutsky et al.,
2001). This ﬁnding suggests that words were playing a different
role for younger and older children. Finally, while words affected
induction in a qualitative manner in older participants (i.e., older
children relied almost exclusively on thewordwhenmaking induc-
tive inferences), young children took into account both words and
appearance information, with words having greater attentional
weight than the visual information. These results present evidence
that the role of words changes with development, but they raise a
number of important questions. Why do words often have greater
attentionalweights than visual information,andwhydowords and
other types of auditory input have different effects on cognitive
tasks early in development?
MECHANISM UNDERLYING ATTENTION TO WORDS:
AUDITORY DOMINANCE
When words (or other auditory stimuli) accompany visual stimuli,
one has to process information presented cross-modally. In some
situations, cross-modal presentation of information can facili-
tate processing. For example, when the same information can be
expressed in multiple sensory modalities (e.g., rhythm, tempo),
5-month-old infants are more likely to learn this information
when it is presented cross-modally than when the same infor-
mation is presented unimodally (Bahrick and Lickliter, 2000; see
Bahrick et al., 2004 for a review). At the same time,words and their
corresponding referents are arbitrarily paired together within the
world, and there are many situations when cross-modal presenta-
tion hinders processing of arbitrary, auditory–visual pairings. For
example, studies examining auditory dominance in infants and
young children show that infants and children often have difﬁ-
culty discriminating visual stimuli when these are paired with an
auditory stimulus (Sloutsky and Napolitano, 2003; Robinson and
Sloutsky, 2004, 2007b, 2010a; Sloutsky and Robinson, 2008). This
ﬁnding is noteworthy because these participants ably discrimi-
nate the same visual stimuli presented in silence (Sloutsky and
Napolitano, 2003; Robinson and Sloutsky, 2004, 2007b, 2010a;
Sloutsky and Robinson, 2008). Furthermore, cross-modal presen-
tation does not appear to attenuate auditory processing (Sloutsky
and Napolitano, 2003; Robinson and Sloutsky, 2010a). We refer
to this asymmetric cost (i.e., cross-modal presentation attenuates
visual but not auditory processing) as auditory dominance. We
believe that auditory dominance underlies many of the effects of
words on cognitive tasks. But what is the mechanism of auditory
dominance?
In an attempt to elucidate the mechanism underlying auditory
dominance, we have formulated a set of theoretical considerations
pertaining to the allocation of attention in the course of cross-
modal processing (for a more extensive review see Robinson and
Sloutsky, 2010b). The overall idea is that attentional resources are
ﬁnite, which results in modalities competing for attention. When
multisensory stimuli are presented simultaneously, the stimulus
that is faster to engage attention wins the competition. During the
later stages of processing, infants and children begin processing
the details of the stimuli; however, due to the selective nature of
sustained attention (see Berg and Richards, 1997; Richards, 2001,
2005, for reviews), it is likely that processing of stimuli in the“win-
ning” modality will be enhanced whereas processing of stimuli in
the “losing” modality will be attenuated. At some point in the
course of processing, the winning modality will release attention,
thus, allowing for more attentional resources to be deployed to the
losingmodality. Given these assumptions: (a) auditory dominance
effects should be more pronounced early in the course of process-
ing because the auditory modality has not had a chance to release
attention (Robinson and Sloutsky, 2008), (b) auditory dominance
should be more pronounced in younger populations due to slower
overall processing speeds (Robinson and Sloutsky, 2004), and (c)
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auditory stimuli that are slow to release attention (e.g., complex
or novel) should exert stronger interference than auditory stimuli
that are fast to release attention (Robinson and Sloutsky, 2007b,
2010a; Sloutsky and Robinson, 2008).
Several factors may also give auditory input a“leg-up”on visual
input. First, auditory stimuli are often transient; whereas, visual
stimuli are often presented for longer durations. Thus, it may be
adaptive to ﬁrst allocate attention to stimuli that will quickly dis-
appear. Second, almost all naturally occurring auditory stimuli are
dynamic in nature as they change in pitch and amplitude across
time. While some visual stimuli can also be dynamic, many visual
stimuli are static for extended periods of time. Third, auditory
stimuli are often processed faster than visual stimuli in adults
(Green and von Gierke, 1984), and due to early maturation of the
auditory system, this difference may be even more pronounced
early in development.
EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR AUDITORY DOMINANCE
Initial evidence for auditory dominance comes from a series
of experiments examining change detection in 4-year-olds and
adults (Sloutsky and Napolitano, 2003). For example, partici-
pants in some of the reported experiments were presented with
an auditory–visual target item (AUDTargetVISTarget) followed by
a test item. Participants had to respond same if the two com-
pound stimuli had the same auditory and visual components as
the target and respond different if either the auditory and/or visual
component changed at test in any of three combinations (e.g.,
AUDTargetVISNew, AUDNewVISTarget, AUDNewVISNew). The audi-
tory components consisted of unfamiliar non-linguistic sounds
and the visual components consisted of unfamiliar images (e.g.,
landscapes). If participants encoded both auditory and visual
stimuli, then they should correctly accept target items as the
same, while correctly rejecting items that had either new visual
or new auditory components as different. Adults were accurate
across all three test trial types, suggesting they encoded both the
auditory and visual components. In contrast, children failed to
report a difference when only the visual input changed at test
(AUDTargetVISNew). At the same time, children ably discriminated
the visual stimuli when presented unimodally in a separate exper-
iment; therefore, it was concluded that the auditory input over-
shadowed the corresponding visual input in children. This ﬁnding
has been replicated using a variety of tasks, including familiariza-
tion and habitation procedures in infants (Robinson and Sloutsky,
2004, 2010a; Sloutsky and Robinson, 2008).
DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS OF WORDS AND SOUNDS ON
VISUAL PROCESSING
These interference effects can be mediated by the type and famil-
iarity of the auditory stimulus (Robinson and Sloutsky, 2007b,
2010a; Sloutsky and Robinson, 2008). In fact, Napolitano and
Sloutsky (2004) demonstrated that it is even possible to reverse
dominance effects (i.e., achieve visual dominance) in 4-year-olds
by using familiar visual stimuli and unfamiliar auditory stimuli.
While such a reversal was not found in infants (Robinson and
Sloutsky, 2010a), there are reasons to believe that it is possible
to attenuate modality dominance effects. Recall that the underly-
ing idea of auditory dominance is that auditory stimuli are often
faster to engage attention than visual stimuli, and processing of
the details of a visual stimulus does not begin until the audi-
tory modality releases attention. Thus, auditory stimuli that are
processed quickly and are fast to release attention (e.g., simple
and/or familiar) should exert less cross-modal interference than
auditory stimuli that are slow to release attention (e.g., complex
and/or novel).
This hypothesis was tested in several experiments by (1)manip-
ulating the type of auditory stimulus or (2) by pre-familiarizing 8-
to 16-month-old infants to the auditory stimulus before pairing
it with a corresponding visual stimulus (Robinson and Slout-
sky, 2007b, 2010a; Sloutsky and Robinson, 2008). In the pre-
familiarization conditions, infants were ﬁrst exposed to the audi-
tory stimuli (presented unimodally), then given a short break, and
then theywere tested in the experiment properwherewemeasured
discrimination of the auditory and/or visual input. Discrimina-
tion of the visual stimuli in the different auditory conditions (e.g.,
unfamiliar sounds or pre-familiarized sounds) was compared to
discrimination of the same visual stimuli in a silent baseline.
The results from these studies demonstrate that words and
sounds have different effects on visual processing (Robinson and
Sloutsky, 2007b; Sloutsky and Robinson, 2008). For example,
using a continuous familiarization procedure (cf., Fantz, 1964;
Roder et al., 2000), 14-month-old infants required less familiar-
ization to reliably discriminate visual images when the images
were paired with words (i.e., “Look at the dax”) than when the
same images were paired with unfamiliar sounds (Robinson and
Sloutsky, 2007b). However, comparisons to a unimodal visual
baseline showed that this effect resulted from unfamiliar sounds
attenuating visual processing, as opposed to words facilitating
visual processing. Furthermore, pre-familiarization experiments
corroborate this ﬁnding: when infants were pre-familiarized to
the unfamiliar non-speech sounds prior to the experiment proper,
interference effects disappeared andwords andnon-speech sounds
had comparable effects on visual processing (Robinson and Slout-
sky,2007b). These ﬁndings are consistentwith the proposedmech-
anismunderlying auditory dominance, and they have direct impli-
cations on a variety of higher-order tasks that rely on processing
of auditory and visual information.
EFFECTS OF WORDS ON COGNITIVE TASKS: INDIVIDUATION,
CATEGORIZATION, AND INDUCTION
Effects of words have been found inmany cognitive tasks; however,
we only focus on individuation, categorization, and induction. In
what followswe consider the directionof these effects (i.e.,whether
the target task is facilitated or hindered by the presence of words)
and their robustness (i.e., whether effects of words exceed those of
non-speech sounds and those of the silent baseline).
INDIVIDUATION
There have been a number of reports suggesting that infants are
more likely to track individual objects across time and space when
these individuals are associated with unique words. For example,
in Xu (2002), 8-month-old infants were familiarized to a duck
and a ball appearing and disappearing from behind an occluder.
At test, the occluder dropped revealing either one object (unex-
pected event) or two objects (expected event). When each object
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was accompanied by a unique word (i.e., “a duck” and “a ball”),
infants expected two objects to be behind the occluder. However,
when the duck and ball were paired with two unfamiliar sounds
or one word, infants did not appear to make this assumption.
To determine if hearing unique words facilitated individua-
tion, Robinson and Sloutsky (2008) conducted two experiments
that familiarized 8- and 14-month-old infants to either: (a) a duck
and ball appearing and disappearing from behind an occluder
or (b) two novel creatures appearing and disappearing in a bas-
ket. The visual stimuli were either paired with two unique words
(e.g., “a duck” and “a ball”), two unique non-linguistic sounds,
or the images were presented in silence. Across both reported
experiments, hearing non-linguistic sounds attenuated learning
compared to the silent condition. When infants were given ample
time to process the images, words had no effect compared to the
silent condition (Experiment 1); however, under shortened stim-
ulus presentations, both words and sounds attenuated learning
compared to the silent condition (Experiment 2). These ﬁnd-
ings are consistent with auditory dominance and further suggest
that differential effects of words and sounds stem from unfamiliar
sounds attenuating visual processing more than count nouns, as
opposed to count nouns serving as a top-down supervisory signal
which facilitates learning.
CATEGORIZATION
Categorization is a fundamental skill for learning, so it is not unex-
pected that categorization abilities emerge early in infancy with
3-month-old infants forming perceptual categories (e.g., Quinn
et al., 1993). Yet, as infants learn to organize their visual world,
they are also learning words that map onto objects within their
surroundings. Given the importance of words in everyday speech
by adults to convey category meaning, it is not without reason to
assume there is a relation between word learning and category
learning. The nature of this relation between words and cate-
gories is not without dispute, however. According to one account,
even very young infants have some understanding that words
(but not other types of auditory input) denote categories, with
words facilitating categorization by highlighting common features
(Ferry et al., 2010). According to other accounts, words are part
of the input (i.e., features), which either facilitate or interfere with
learning (Samuelson and Smith, 1999; Colunga and Smith, 2005;
Robinson and Sloutsky, 2007a; Plunkett et al., 2008; Best et al.,
2010, 2011b).
There have been reports that words (speciﬁcally count nouns)
facilitate infants’ categorization. However, similar to individuation
research,most of the studies pointing to facilitative effects of words
on categorization did not include a silent baseline. Instead, these
studies compared infants’ and children’s performance in a word
conditionwith that in anon-linguistic soundorno label condition.
For example, to estimate effects of words on category learning,
Waxman and colleagues (e.g., Balaban and Waxman, 1997; Fulk-
erson and Waxman, 2007; Ferry et al., 2010) compared 3-, 6-, and
9-month-old infants’ learning of a category in a word condition
where the same word (e.g.,“a rabbit”or“do you see the toma”) was
associated with members of the to-be-learned category to infants’
learning of a category in a sound condition where the same non-
linguistic sound was associated with category members (but see
Best et al., 2010 and Waxman and Braun, 2005, where effects of
common words were also compared to unique words). As in audi-
tory dominance research, words and sounds often had different
effects, with only infants in the word conditions learning the cate-
gories (Balaban andWaxman, 1997; Fulkerson andWaxman, 2007;
Robinson and Sloutsky, 2007a).
However, using the non-linguistic sound (or unique label) con-
dition as a control makes sense only if it is established that sounds
or unique words facilitate category responding, and it is impor-
tant to determine if effects of words exceed the general facilitative
effects of sounds. While work by Roberts and Jacob (1991) is often
cited as evidence of general auditory facilitation effects, Roberts
(1995) demonstrated that sounds and labels facilitate learning only
when the presentation of auditory inputwas contingent on infants’
looking (e.g., infants did not hear words or sounds when look-
ing away from visual stimuli). This suggests that the contingency
rather than the presence of the auditory stimulus may be driving
the facilitative effect. Furthermore, auditory dominance research
demonstrates that both sounds and words can interfere with visual
processing (Robinson and Sloutsky, 2007b; Sloutsky and Robin-
son, 2008). Therefore, without a unimodal visual baseline, it is
unclearwhether differences between two auditory conditions (e.g.,
words vs. sounds), if found, stem from words facilitating catego-
rization, from sounds interferingwith categorization,or fromboth
(see Robinson and Sloutsky, 2007a for additional discussion).
The studies that have directly compared effects of words on
categorization to a silent condition have yielded mixed results
(Roberts and Jacob, 1991; Roberts, 1995; Waxman and Markow,
1995; Fulkerson and Haaf, 2003; Robinson and Sloutsky, 2007a;
Plunkett et al., 2008). In Fulkerson and Haaf (2003) and Waxman
and Markow (1995), effects of words did not exceed the silent
condition when 9-, 12-, and 15-month-olds infants were trained
and tested on basic-level categories; however, effects of words did
appear to facilitate categorization above the silent condition when
the categories were more abstract. Both words and sounds can
facilitate categorization at 15months when the presentation of
auditory input is contingent on infants’ looking; however, neither
wordsnor sounds facilitate categorizationwhen this contingency is
broken (Roberts and Cuff, 1989; Roberts and Jacob, 1991; Roberts,
1995). While Plunkett et al. (2008) did not ﬁnd facilitative effects
of words per se, their study demonstrated that words can affect the
structure of the learned category: when presented with the same
visual stimuli, 10-month-old infants who heard one word (e.g.,
“Look, dax”) formed one category; whereas, infants who heard
two words (“Look, dax” and “Look, rif”) formed two categories.
Research from our lab demonstrates that words either have no
effect on categorization or they interfere with categorization. For
example, inRobinson and Sloutsky (2007a),8- and 12-month-olds
were familiarized to different exemplars from the same category,
and each member of the category was either associated with the
same word (e.g., “a cat”), the same non-linguistic sound, or no
auditory input was provided (i.e., a silent condition). After famil-
iarization, infants were simultaneously presented with a novel
stimulus from the familiarized category and a novel stimulus
from a novel category. Categorization was inferred from increased
looking to the novel category items compared to the familiarized
category items. At both 8 and 12months of age, infants were more
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likely to form categories in the silent condition than in the word
or sound conditions. While 12-month-olds were more likely to
learn categorieswhen itemswere accompanied bywords thannon-
linguistic sounds, this effect was driven by non-linguistic sounds
hindering categorization more than words. These ﬁndings are
consistent with previous research examining auditory dominance
(Robinson and Sloutsky, 2007a; Sloutsky and Robinson, 2008).
The hindering effects of words on categorization did not com-
pletely disappear with age. We presented 4-year-old children with
a category learning task where they had to learn two types of ﬂow-
ers, and we tested categorization at various points in the course
of training (Best et al., 2011a). The experiment had a between-
subjects design, with participants randomly assigned to one of
two experimental conditions (i.e., word or silent). In the word
condition, the two types of ﬂowers were labeled during training
[e.g., “These ﬂowers are called zibblers (blickets)”]. At test we pre-
sented novel ﬂowers and children had to determine if the ﬂowers
were zibblers or blickets. In the silent condition, we presented
ﬂowers in silence and children had to associate the two types of
ﬂowers with two creatures (i.e., creature 1 ate one type of ﬂower
and creature 2 ate a different type of ﬂower). At test we presented
novel ﬂowers and children had to determine which creature ate
that type of ﬂower. The most interesting ﬁnding from this study
was that effects of hearing words during training hindered cate-
gory learning compared to when objects were presented in silence,
with only children in the silent condition reliably categorizing the
novel ﬂowers. This study, in conjunctionwithRobinson and Slout-
sky (2007a), casts doubt on the claim that words are supervisory
signals that facilitate category learning.
However, the above mentioned studies only focused on the
outcome of learning, not on the process of learning. Thus, one
limitation of previous research is that the mechanisms underlying
the effects of words on categorization are often inferred by exam-
ining infants’ novelty preference at test, rather than directly testing
how words affect attention in the course of category learning. We
have recently addressed this issue by using an eye tracker to exam-
ine infants’ ﬁxations to category-relevant and irrelevant features
in the course of learning (Best et al., 2011b). Six- to 8-month-
old infants in this study were familiarized to novel images, which
were either presented in silence or paired with the same word (e.g.,
“Look at the feps. Do you see the feps?”).At test,we simultaneously
presented a novel item from the familiar category and a novel item
from a new category, and categorization was assessed by increased
looking to the novel category.
If words facilitate categorization by directing infant’s attention
to category-relevant features then infants who hear the same word
paired with different category members should show an increase
in looking to category deﬁning features (in terms of ﬁrst look
or overall looking times). However, infants who heard the same
word paired with different exemplars during familiarization did
not increase looking to category-relevant features across train-
ing, nor did they accumulate more looking to relevant features
than infants in a silent condition. In fact, the pattern was in the
opposite direction, with infants who heard words during train-
ing reliably looking to category-irrelevant features. Furthermore,
whereas infants in the silent condition exhibited a reliable nov-
elty preference between 0 and 2000ms within test trials, infants’
looking at test in the word condition never differed from chance
performance. These ﬁndings demonstrate that words hindered
category learning at 6–8months of age and cast doubt on the
claim that facilitative effects of words stem from words directing
infants’ attention to category-relevant features.
In summary,while it is well documented that words and sounds
can have different effects on category learning, most of the pub-
lished ﬁndings do not include a silent condition to serve as a
control. Thus, it is often unclear if common words are facilitating
categorization or if non-linguistic sounds, unique words, or no
label phrases are disrupting categorization. We have also demon-
strated that words and sounds can have different effects on indi-
viduation and category learning (Robinson and Sloutsky, 2007a,
2008); however, consistent with auditory dominance research, this
effect stems from non-linguistic sounds hindering categorization
more than words. Furthermore, eye tracking data provide no
support for the claim that words facilitate categorization by high-
lighting common features (Best et al., 2011b). While there are
reasons to believe that words eventually become supervisory sig-
nals that facilitate categorization, the reported studies question
whether such as mechanism is at play early in development.
INDUCTION
The studies reviewed so far have indirectly tested whether words
are supervisory signals or features by focusing on facilitation
and interference effects. However, there are tasks developed for
addressing this issue more directly. For example, in Yamauchi and
Markman’s (2000) work, adults were presented with two tasks. In
the classiﬁcation task, adults were presented with bugs comprised
of multiple features, and they had to determine whether the bug
belonged to category 1 or category 2. Thus, participants had to use
the features to predict the category label. In the induction task,par-
ticipants were presented with bugs and corresponding words, and
they had to use the words and features to infer a missing feature.
If words are simply features, then there should be no difference in
performance between the two tasks because participants are mak-
ing inferences based on the same number of features. However, if
words are category markers (i.e., a supervisory signal), then per-
formance in the two tasks should differ because they can rely on
the category marker in the induction task but not in the classiﬁca-
tion task. They found that adults relied almost exclusively on the
words in the induction task, suggesting that words are more than
features for adults.
Using a similar approach, Deng and Sloutsky (2012) tested
whether words are features or category markers in 4- to 5-year-
olds and adults. However, in the current experiment we also pitted
the words (e.g., “This is a ﬂurp”) against a feature that was more
salient than the words. This manipulation was critically impor-
tant because if words are more than features, then salience of the
competing feature should not matter – participants should rely on
words when performing induction. However, if words are features,
then participants should rely on highly salient features when they
are pitted against words.
The results indicate that young children exhibited overwhelm-
ing reliance on a highly salient feature and not on the category
label, whether the label was novel (Experiment 1) or familiar
(Experiment 2). Thus, in contrast to adults in Yamauchi and
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Markman (1998), children responded similarly across both tasks,
suggesting that words are features for young children. The results
are more complicated in adults: some adults exhibited consistent
reliance on the salient feature and some relied on the label. Taken
together these results indicate that for young children (and for
some adults) category labels may function as features, as little
reliance on category label was observed when it was pitted against
the highly salient feature. At the same time, for some adults labels
may be category markers. These results cast doubt on the view
that labels start out as supervisory signals, suggesting instead that
early in development labels are features, but they may become
supervisory signals in the course of development.
The notion that words are features also predicts that, like
other perceptual features, the phonological similarity of the word
should affect children’s inductions. To test this hypothesis, Slout-
sky and Fisher (2012) presented 5-year-olds and adults with lexical
extension and property induction tasks, and they systematically
manipulated the phonological similarity of the word. In the lexical
extension task, a computer presented a target object and corre-
sponding word (e.g., “gama”) and participants had to determine
which of four test items would be called a guma. Children but not
adults extended the phonologically similar word to a perceptually
similar object. In the induction task, participants were presented
with a target object and two test objects and they had to determine
which test item shared an unobservable property with the target.
Consistent with previous ﬁndings, words contributed in a quanti-
tativemanner for young children. Childrenweremore likely to rely
on the word to make inductions when the target and one of the test
items shared the exact sameword (e.g.,gama and gama) thanwhen
the target and test items were labeled with phonologically similar
words (e.g., gama and guma). More importantly, children were
also more likely to rely on phonologically similar (yet highly dis-
criminable) words than on phonologically dissimilar words (e.g.,
satu and kipa). Thus, similar to other perceptual features, words
and effects of words on induction are also inﬂuenced by the per-
ceptual similarity of the word. While these ﬁndings are consistent
with the “words as features” account, they pose a challenge for
the idea that words are top-down supervisory signals that denote
category membership.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The studies reviewed in this paper point to clear developmental
differences in the role of words in a variety of cognitive tasks and
in the processing of arbitrary auditory–visual pairings more gen-
erally. For example, there is a gradual decrease in relying on words
in similarity judgment tasks between 4 and 12 years of age and
an increase in relying on words in induction and categorization
tasks (Sloutsky and Lo, 1999; Sloutsky et al., 2001). Five-year-olds
and adults use words differently when making inductive general-
izations and lexical extensions (Deng and Sloutsky, 2012; Sloutsky
and Fisher, 2012), and there are considerable differences in 4-year-
olds’ and adults’ processing of arbitrary auditory–visual pairings
(Sloutsky and Napolitano, 2003; Robinson and Sloutsky, 2004).
However, drawing strong conclusions about the developmental
trajectory early in development is difﬁcult. This difﬁculty stems
primarily from using different methodologies within infant and
child populations. Given the ﬁndings byDeng and Sloutsky (2012)
and Sloutsky and Fisher (2012), it seems reasonable to posit that
young infants are also treating words as features; however, to fully
capture the developmental trajectory, future research will need to
test infants and children using identical procedures.
While the current review primarily focused on research within
our lab, it will be important to reconcile the current infant ﬁnd-
ings with previous research. When effects of words are assessed by
comparing performance in a word condition (e.g., the same word
denotes all members of the category) to non-linguistic sounds,
varying labels, and no labels, it is typically found that words
have a different effect than other types of input (Balaban and
Waxman, 1997; Xu, 2002; Fulkerson and Waxman, 2007; Ferry
et al., 2010). However, when effects of words are assessed by mak-
ing comparisons to a unimodal visual baseline, the ﬁndings are
mixed with some evidence suggesting that words interfere with
learning (Roberts and Jacob, 1991; Roberts, 1995; Waxman and
Markow, 1995; Fulkerson and Haaf, 2003; Robinson and Slout-
sky, 2007a; Plunkett et al., 2008). While the former comparisons
clearly demonstrate that different types of auditory input have dif-
ferent effects, it is difﬁcult to determine what is driving this effect
without a silent baseline (e.g., are non-linguistic sounds interfer-
ing with learning or are words facilitating learning?). If words
act as top-down supervisory signals that facilitate categorization
by directing attention to the category-relevant features, then this
should be evident in eye tracking data with infants who hear words
accumulatingmore looking to the relevant features andmore likely
to learn categories compared to infants who do not hear words.
While this hypothesis requires further consideration, our prelimi-
nary eye tracking study found no support for the claim that labels
facilitate categorization (Best et al., 2011b).
Finally, while additional research is needed to examine the
developmental trajectory, it will be important to determine what
mechanisms best account for the developmental pattern. Accord-
ing to Sloutsky (2010), several components may underlie chil-
dren’s abilities to use labels as top-down supervisory signals. First,
because many words are presented auditorily and many objects
are presented visually, children need to be efﬁcient at processing
arbitrary auditory–visual pairings. Second, because many causal
or central features that deﬁne a category are implicit in nature
and not directly observable in the input (e.g., essences, causal rela-
tions, etc.), children have to learn how to ignore the perceptual
details of a stimulus and attend to these less obvious features.
It seems reasonable to posit that this ability requires top-down
selective attention and the development of the prefrontal cortex
(Diamond and Goldman-Rakic, 1989; Bunge and Zelazo, 2006;
Davidson et al., 2006), and therefore may not be present early in
development.
CONCLUSION
In summary, associating words with objects and more abstract
categories is a necessary step in language acquisition, and it is well
established that words affect performance on a variety of cogni-
tive tasks. The research in our lab suggests that words function
as features, and effects of words on cognitive tasks are initially
grounded in the dynamics of cross-modal processing. This pro-
posal suggests that words functioning as featuresmay either hinder
task performance (i.e., when the task requires processing of details
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of visual input, such as when items are presented sequentially) or
facilitate performance (i.e., when reliance primarily on words may
be sufﬁcient for performing the task, such as in match-to-sample
and other tasks where stimuli are presented simultaneously). We
reviewed a substantial body of evidence, supporting this proposal,
indicating that words start out as features affecting infants’ and
children’s performance on cognitive tasks in a bottom-up man-
ner, but they may become supervisory signals in the process of
development. Much additional research is needed to understand
why, how, and when this transformation takes place.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Writing of this manuscript is supported by National Science Foun-
dation Grant BCS-0720135 Institute of Education Sciences, US
Department of Education Grant R305H050125, and by National
Institutes of Health Grant R01HD056105 toVladimir M. Sloutsky.
REFERENCES
Bahrick, L. E., and Lickliter, R.
(2000). Intersensory redundancy
guides attentional selectivity and
perceptual learning in infancy. Dev.
Psychol. 36, 190–201.
Bahrick, L. E., Lickliter, R., and Flom,
R. (2004). Intersensory redundancy
guides the development of selective
attention, perception, and cognition
in infancy. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 13,
99–102.
Balaban, M. T., and Waxman, S.
R. (1997). Do words facilitate
object categorization in 9-month old
infants? J. Exp. Child. Psychol. 64,
3–26.
Berg, W. K., and Richards, J. E.
(1997). “Attention across time in
infant development,” in Attention
and Orienting: Sensory and Motiva-
tional Processes, eds P. J. Lang, R. F.
Simons, and M. T. Balaban (Mah-
wah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
Inc.), 347–368.
Best, C. A., Robinson, C. W., and Slout-
sky,V.M. (2010).“The effect of labels
on visual attention: an eye track-
ing study,” in Proceedings of the 32nd
Annual Conference of the Cognitive
Science Society, eds S. Ohlsson and
R. Catrambone (Austin: Cognitive
Science Society), 1846–1851.
Best, C. A., Robinson, C. W., and Slout-
sky, V. M. (2011a). “The effect of
labels on children’s category learn-
ing,” in Proceedings of the 33rd
Annual Conference of the Cogni-
tive Science Society, eds L. Carl-
son, C. Hölscher, and T. Shipley
(Austin: Cognitive Science Society),
3332–3336.
Best, C. A., Robinson, C. W., and Slout-
sky, V. M. (2011b). “The effect of
labels on categorization: is attention
to relevant features a good index of
infants’ category learning?” in Pro-
ceedings of the 33rd Annual Confer-
ence of the Cognitive Science Society,
eds L. Carlson, C. Hölscher, and T.
Shipley (Austin: Cognitive Science
Society), 2751–2755.
Bunge, S. A., and Zelazo, P. D. (2006).
A brain-based account of the devel-
opment of rule use in child-
hood. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 15,
118–121.
Casasola, M. (2008). The development
of infants’ spatial categories. Curr.
Dir. Psychol. Sci. 17, 21–25.
Casasola, M., and Bhagwat, J. (2007).
Does a novel word facilitate 18-
month-olds’ categorization of a
spatial relation? Child Dev. 78,
1818–1829.
Colunga, E., and Smith, L. B. (2005).
From the lexicon to expectations
about kinds: a role for associative
learning. Psychol. Rev. 112, 347–382.
Davidson, M. C., Amso, D., Ander-
son, L. C., and Diamond, A. (2006).
Development of cognitive control
and executive functions from 4 to
13 years: evidence from manipu-
lations of memory, inhibition, and
task switching. Neuropsychologia 44,
2037–2078.
Deng, W., and Sloutsky, V. M. (2012).
Carrot-eaters and moving heads:
salient features provide greater sup-
port for inductive inference than
category labels. Psychol. Sci. 23,
178–186.
Diamond, A., and Goldman-Rakic, P.
S. (1989). Comparison of human
infants and rhesus monkeys on
Piaget’s AB task: evidence for depen-
dence on dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex. Exp. Brain Res. 74, 24–40.
Fantz, R. L. (1964). Visual experience in
infants: decreased attention to famil-
iar patterns relative to novel ones.
Science 46, 668–670.
Ferry, A., Hespos, S., and Waxman, S.
(2010). Categorization in 3- and 4-
month-old infants: an advantage of
words over tones. Child Dev. 81,
472–479.
Fulkerson, A. L., and Haaf, R. A. (2003).
The inﬂuence of labels, non-labeling
sounds, and source of auditory input
on 9- and 15-month-olds’ object
categorization. Infancy 4, 349–369.
Fulkerson, A. L., and Waxman, S. R.
(2007). Words (but not tones) facil-
itate object categorization: evidence
from 6- and 12-month-olds. Cogni-
tion 105, 218–228.
Gelman, S. A., and Markman, E. (1986).
Categories and induction in young
children. Cognition 23, 183–209.
Gentner, D., and Goldin-Meadow,
S. (2003). Language in Mind:
Advances in the Study of Language
and Thought. Cambridge: MIT
Press.
Gleitman,L., andPapafragou,A. (2005).
“Language and thought,” in Cam-
bridge Handbook of Thinking and
Reasoning, eds K. Holyoak and R.
Morrison (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press), 633–661.
Gliga, T., Volein, A., and Csibra,
G. (2010). Verbal labels modulate
perceptual object processing in one-
year-old infants. J. Cogn. Neurosci.
22, 2781–2789.
Graham, S. A., Kilbreath, C. S., and
Welder, A. N. (2004). Thirteen-
month-olds rely on shared labels
and shape similarity for inductive
inferences. Child Dev. 75, 409–427.
Green, D. M., and von Gierke, S. M.
(1984). Visual and auditory choice
reaction times. Acta Psychologica 55,
231–247.
Keates, J., and Graham, S. A. (2008).
Category labels or attributes: why do
labels guide infants’ inductive infer-
ences? Psychol. Sci. 19, 1287–1293.
Lupyan,G., Rakison,D. H., and McClel-
land, J. L. (2007). Language is not
just for talking: labels facilitate learn-
ing of novel categories. Psychol. Sci.
18, 1077–1083.
Marr, D. (1982), Vision: A Computa-
tional Investigation into the Human
Representation and Processing of
Visual Information. New York: W. H.
Freeman.
Napolitano, A. C., and Sloutsky, V. M.
(2004). Is a pictureworth a thousand
words? The ﬂexible nature of modal-
ity dominance in young children.
Child Dev. 75, 1850–1870.
Plunkett, K. (2011). “The role of audi-
tory stimuli in infant categoriza-
tion,” in Infant Perception and Cog-
nition: Recent Advances, Emerging
Theories, and Future Directions, eds
L. Oakes, C. Cashon, M. Casasola,
and D. Rakison (New York: Oxford
University Press), 203–221.
Plunkett, K., Hu, J. F., and Cohen, L.
B. (2008). Labels can override per-
ceptual categories in early infancy.
Cognition 106, 665–681.
Quinn, P. C., Eimas, P. D., and
Rosenkrantz, S. L. (1993). Evi-
dence for representations of per-
ceptually similar natural categories
by 3-month-old and 4-month-old
infants. Perception 22, 463–475.
Richards, J. E. (2001). “Attention in
young infants: a developmental
psychophysiological perspective,” in
Handbook of Developmental Cogni-
tive Neuroscience, eds C. A. Nelson
and M. Luciana (Cambridge: MIT
Press), 321–338.
Richards, J. E. (2005). “Development of
covert orienting in young infants,”
in Neurobiology of Attention, Chap.
14, eds L. Itti, G. Rees, and
J. Tsotsos (Burlington: Academic
Press/Elsevier), 82–88.
Roberts, K. (1995). Categorical
responding in 15-month-olds:
inﬂuence of the noun-category bias
and the covariation between visual
ﬁxation and auditory input. Cogn.
Dev. 10, 21–41.
Roberts, K., and Cuff, M. D. (1989).
Categorization studies of 9- to 15-
month-old infants: evidence for
superordinate categorization? Infant
Behav. Dev. 12, 265–288.
Roberts, K., and Jacob, M. (1991). Lin-
guistic versus attentional inﬂuences
on nonlinguistic categorization in
15-month-old infants. Cogn. Dev. 6,
355–375.
Robinson, C. W., and Sloutsky, V. M.
(2004). Auditory dominance and its
change in the course of develop-
ment. Child Dev. 75, 1387–1401.
Robinson, C. W., and Sloutsky, V. M.
(2007a). Linguistic labels and cate-
gorization in infancy: do labels facil-
itate or hinder? Infancy 11, 233–253.
Robinson, C. W., and Sloutsky, V. M.
(2007b). Visual processing speed:
effects of auditory input on visual
processing. Dev. Sci. 10, 734–740.
Robinson, C. W., and Sloutsky, V. M.
(2008). Effects of auditory input
in individuation tasks. Dev. Sci. 11,
869–881.
Robinson, C. W., and Sloutsky, V. M.
(2010a). Effects of multimodal pre-
sentation and stimulus familiarity
on auditory and visual process-
ing. J. Exp. Child. Psychol. 107,
351–358.
Robinson, C. W., and Sloutsky, V.
M. (2010b). Development of cross-
modal processing. Wiley Interdiscip.
Rev. Cogn. Sci. 1, 135–141.
www.frontiersin.org April 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 95 | 7
Robinson et al. Words and cognitive tasks
Roder, B. J., Bushnell, E. W., and Sas-
seville, A. M. (2000). Infants’ pref-
erences for familiarity and novelty
during the course of visual process-
ing. Infancy 1, 491–507.
Rumelhart, D. E. (1989). “The archi-
tecture of mind: a connectionist
approach,” in Foundations of
Cognitive Science, ed. M. I. Pos-
ner (Cambridge: MIT Press),
133–160.
Samuelson, L. K., and Smith, L. B.
(1999). Early noun vocabularies: do
ontology, category organization and
syntax correspond? Cognition 73,
1–33.
Sloutsky, V. M. (2010). From percep-
tual categories to concepts: what
develops? Cogn. Sci. 34, 1244–1286.
Sloutsky, V. M., and Fisher, A. V.
(2004). Induction and categoriza-
tion in young children: a similarity-
based model. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen.
133, 166–188.
Sloutsky, V. M., and Fisher, A. V.
(2005). Similarity, induction, nam-
ing, and categorization (SINC):
generalization or verbal inductive
reasoning? Response to Heit and
Hayes. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 134,
606–611.
Sloutsky,V. M., and Fisher, A. V. (2012).
Linguistic labels: conceptual mark-
ers or object features?. J. Exp. Child.
Psychol. 111, 65–86.
Sloutsky, V. M., and Lo, Y. (1999).
How much does a shared name
make things similar? Part 1: linguis-
tic labels and the development of
similarity judgment. Dev. Psychol. 6,
1478–1492.
Sloutsky, V. M., Lo, Y., and Fisher,
A. V. (2001). How much does
a shared name make things sim-
ilar? Linguistic labels, similarity,
and the development of induc-
tive inference. Child Dev. 72,
1695–1709.
Sloutsky, V. M., and Napolitano, A. C.
(2003). Is a picture worth a thou-
sand words? Preference for auditory
modality in young children. Child
Dev. 74, 822–833.
Sloutsky, V. M., and Robinson, C.
W. (2008). The role of words and
sounds in visual processing: from
overshadowing to attentional tun-
ing. Cogn. Sci. 32, 342–365.
Waxman, S. R., and Booth, A. E. (2003).
The origins and evolution of links
between word learning and con-
ceptual organization: new evidence
from 11-month-olds. Dev. Sci. 6,
130–137.
Waxman, S. R., and Braun, I. (2005).
Consistent (but not variable)
names as invitations to form object
categories: new evidence from
12-month-old infants. Cognition 95,
B59–B68.
Waxman, S. R., and Markow, D. B.
(1995). Words as invitations to
form categories: evidence from 12-
month-old infants. Cogn. Psychol.
29, 257–302.
Whorf, B. L. (1956). Language, Thought
and Reality. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Xu, F. (2002). The role of lan-
guage in acquiring object kind
concepts in infancy. Cognition 85,
223–250.
Yamauchi, T., and Markman, A. B.
(1998). Category learning by infer-
ence and classiﬁcation. J.Mem. Lang.
39, 124–148.
Yamauchi, T., and Markman, A. B.
(2000). Inference using categories. J.
Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 26,
776–795.
Conﬂict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any
commercial or ﬁnancial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conﬂict of interest.
Received: 14December 2011; accepted: 13
March 2012; published online: 11 April
2012.
Citation: Robinson CW, Best CA,
Deng WS and Sloutsky VM (2012) The
role of words in cognitive tasks: what,
when, and how? Front. Psychology 3:95.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00095
This article was submitted to Frontiers in
Developmental Psychology, a specialty of
Frontiers in Psychology.
Copyright © 2012 Robinson, Best , Deng
and Sloutsky. This is an open-access
article distributed under the terms of
the Creative Commons Attribution Non
Commercial License, which permits non-
commercial use, distribution, and repro-
duction in other forums, provided the
original authors and source are credited.
Frontiers in Psychology | Developmental Psychology April 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 95 | 8
